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2An Analysis and  Critique of the BIS Proposal on Capital Adequacy and Ratings
Abstract
This paper has examined two specific aspects of stage 1 of the (BIS’s) Bank for
International Settlement’s proposed reforms to the 8% risk-based capital ratio. We argue
that relying on “traditional” agency ratings could produce cyclically lagging rather leading
capital requirements, resulting in an enhanced rather than reduced degree of instability in
the banking and financial system. Despite this possible shortcoming, we believe that
sensible risk based weighting of capital requirements is a step in the right direction. The
current risk based bucketing proposal, which is tied to external agency ratings, or possibly
to internal bank ratings, however, lacks a sufficient degree of granularity. In particular,
lumping A and BBB (investment grade corporate borrowers) together with BB and B
(below investment grade borrowers) severely misprices risk within that bucket and calls, at
a minimum, for that bucket to be split into two.  We examine the default loss experience on
corporate bonds for the period 1981-1999 and propose a revised weighting system which
more closely resembles the actual loss experience on credit assets.
31.  Introduction
In June 1999, the BIS released its long awaited proposal on reform of the 8% risk-based
capital ratio for credit risk that has been in effect since 1993.1 The 8% ratio has been criticized
on at least three major grounds. First, it gives an equal risk-weighting to all corporate credits
whether of high or low credit quality. Second, it fails to incorporate potential capital savings
from credit (loan) portfolio diversification. The latter is a result of its simple additive nature. And
third, it has led to extensive regulatory capital arbitrage which adds to the riskiness of bank asset
portfolios.
In its June 1999 draft, the BIS proposed a three-stage reform process.2  In the first stage,
the 8% risk based ratio (where all loans receive the same 100% risk-weighting) would be
replaced by weightings based on the external credit agency rating of the borrower (we discuss
this proposal in more detail in Section 2 of the paper). In the second stage, at some unspecified
time in the future, when some sophisticated banks have developed their own internal rating
systems for loans, a transformation may be made to calculating capital requirements based on a
bank’s allocation of its loans to the various grades/ratings in its own internal loan rating system.
Finally, in the third stage, given appropriate model and data base development and testing, some
banks may be able to use their own internal credit risk models to calculate capital requirements.
Importantly, these internal models allow for portfolio diversification effects.
A number of issues have been raised about stages two and three of the reform proposal
e.g., how will the internal rating systems of different banks----especially if they continue to
develop independently of each other----be grouped into some standardized set of capital risk
                                                
1 The 8% ratio was phased-in over the 1988-1992 period, following the 1988 Basel Accord. Some countries have actually
adopted a capital adequacy ratio of over 8% (e.g., Brazil uses 11%). In all cases, the level of capital is to help to ensure a banks
solvency against unexpected losses.
2 The discussion period for the proposal runs until March 2000. A revised proposal will then be distributed with a subsequent
second, probably shorter, discussion and commentary period.
4weights; that is will a rating of 1 for Citigroup be the same as a 1 for BankAmerica or will a
rating of 1 for a bank in the United States be equivalent to a 1 for a bank in Germany?3  Also,
what is the appropriate mapping of the internal rating model with external ratings? While these
are important issues, this paper concentrates on the first stage of the proposal. In particular, we
raise a number of concerns (backed by data) regarding the use of rating agencies rating systems
in a reformed capital adequacy system in the manner that the 1999 BIS proposal stipulates.
Section 2 of this paper briefly outlines the BIS stage-one proposal. Section 3 presents
some empirical evidence that questions the proposal and shows that similar “risk-shifting”
incentives (i.e., regulatory capital arbitrage) exist under the new plan as under the current 8%
risk-based capital ratio.  These empirical tests are supplemented by simulations on sample data to
better assess expected and unexpected losses form actual bond portfolios. We will show that the
current Basel “one size fits all” approach is not sufficiently modified in the new approach.
Finally, Section 4 provides our recommendation to enlarge the number of “buckets” with
different risk weightings to better approximate actual loss experience and risk categories.
2. The BIS Stage 1 Proposal
Table 1 shows the proposed reform of the 8% ratio in stage 1 of the new plan. As noted in
the introduction, currently all corporate loans have the same 100% risk-weight (for risk adjusted
assets) implying the same minimum capital requirement (e.g., 8%). Under the new proposal,
corporate borrowers rated AAA to AA – by S & P, or the equivalent authorized rating agencies
(see Table 2), will have a risk weight of 20%. This implies a capital ratio of .2 x 8% = 1.6%;
much lower than at present for “high quality” loans. In what follows, we shall label this category
“bucket 1.”  For corporate borrowers rated A+ to B-, the risk weight will remain at 100%, i.e.,
                                                
3 See W. Tracey and M. Carey (1998) for a discussion and survey of banks’ internal ratings systems.  A more recent discussion
paper by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) examines the range of Banks’ internal rating systems.
5they will continue to have a capital ratio of 8%; we will call this group of borrowers “bucket 2.”
For those borrowers rated below B-, the risk weighting increases to 150%, implying a capital
ratio of 1.5 x 8% = 12%. It might be noted that, somewhat paradoxically, unrated corporate
borrowers are given a  lower 100% risk weight and thus an 8% capital requirement. A similar,
but less broad bucketing approach is adopted for sovereigns and banks. In particular, the current
system of a zero risk weight for OECD countries and a 100% risk-weight for all other countries
is replaced by four new buckets based on agency ratings.
In the next Section, we use data on bond ratings, defaults and loss rates to more closely
examine the three-bucket approach for corporate borrowers. We do this with two questions in
mind. First, does this approach lead to bank capital reserves rising prior to recessions, i.e., before
the realization of loan losses typically occurs -- as should happen under an “ideal” system?  In
particular, a well-designed regulatory system should see capital rising during periods of high
profitability and earnings for banks (which normally coincides with periods of business
expansions) and falling during recessions as “unexpected losses” are written off against capital.
At the very least, the size of the capital reserve should be coincident with the business cycle even
if it does not lead it.
Second, does the bucketing system make economic sense? That is, how homogeneous in
terms of risk are the different buckets. For example, bucket 2 encompasses both investment
grade debt (A and BBB) as well as below investment grade debt (BB and B). Moreover, if they
are not homogenous, what relative risk-weighting scheme would these data suggest?
63. Empirical Results
In this section we use data from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s and from the NYU
Salomon Center’s data base on Corporate bond defaults4 and losses on defaults in order to gain
insight into these two questions.
3.1 The Lead-Lag Relationship of Capital Reserves
As discussed above, ideally, capital reserves for unexpected losses should be
accumulated during periods of high bank profitability and business expansion. Banks find it
much more difficult, if not impossible, to add substantially to their capital reserves when profits
are low and the economy is in recession. And, reserves should be adequate prior to, not after
defaults and losses increase.
In Figure 1, we have used Moody’s bond ratings to group bonds outstanding over the
March 1989 to March 1999 period into the three buckets implied by the Moody’s equivalents to
the S&P ratings shown in Table 1. The period 1989-1991 is a period of recession while the
period of the current expansion begins post-1992. Although these data include only one
recession, they are representative of a number of recent critiques that have found that rating
agencies move slowly and their ratings are often inflexible. As a result, external ratings’ ability
to predict default with a long (if any) lead has been questioned. Indeed, Figure 1 suggests that a
capital adequacy system built around traditional agency ratings might even follow, rather than
lead, the business cycle. As can be seen, the proportion of bonds in bucket 2 appear to fall
continuously over the March 1989 to March 1991 period, while those in Buckets 1 and 3 appear
to rise continuously. Specifically, the proportion of bonds in bucket 3, with the 150% risk
                                                
4 The data includes defaults on straight (non-convertible) corporate bonds over the period 1971-1999, ratings and prices on the
defaulting issues at birth, one year and one month prior to default as well as just after default.
7weight, peaks in September 1991, near the end of the recession rather than at the beginning.
Figure 2 shows a similar result for S&P ratings.  As can be seen, while the percentage of bonds
in bucket 3 is small, its proportion still rises over the 1990 to 1991 period. If risk weights and
capital requirements were tied to these buckets, this could have meant (had the new proposal
been in effect during the 1989-1991 recession) that some banks would have had to build up their
minimum reserve requirements during the recession with a peak minimum capital ratio being
achieved at or near the recession’s end.5 That is, rather than leading the recession, minimum
capital requirements would have been lagging it and also the rising wave of loan defaults.
This suggests that alternatives to the rating agencies’ bucket approach be assessed. For
example, there are a number of rating and default forecasting approaches that have been
developed in the last decade. These include ones by Jonsson & Fridson (1996), Moody’s (1999),
and Altman (1989). The first two utilize the existing rating proportions and add macroeconomic
variables to the forecasting regression. The latter assumes a stable default aging frequency by
original rating, and forecasts defaults based on the previous thirty years of default aging
experience, in essence a regression-to-the-mean approach.
A second possibility is that the individual issuers of loans be subjected to a micro-default
probability model and the aggregate of this bottom-up approach be assessed for expected and
unexpected (capital) losses of the loan portfolio. Approaches with this objective include equity
value option models (expected default frequencies) and multivariate models which involve
financial statement and market equity variables.6
                                                
5 The years 1990 and 1991 saw defaults rise dramatically in both the corporate loan and bond markets. Indeed,
corporate bond default rates in each of those years were over 10% of the outstanding bonds at the start of each year
(see Altman, Cooke & Kishore, 1999).
6 A survey of these methods can be found in Altman and Saunders (1997).
8A final idea exploits the use of credit spreads to define the buckets. It can be empirically
demonstrated that credit spreads were particularly accurate forecasters of subsequent default
rates at the start of 1990 and again at the start of 1991.7 The credit spread indicator is a
commonly used barometer of risk in financial systems and for economic cycles by both the
government and banks.
3.2 Bucket Risk Homogeneity
To analyze the second question, bucket risk homogeneity, we examined data on bond
issues (and issuers) over the 1981-1999 (September) period. Our focus of attention was the
degree of homogeneity (heterogeneity) of unexpected loss rates over the sample period.
Following most approaches of economic capital and loan loss reserve calculations, loan loss
reserves are meant to cover expected (or mean) losses while economic capital reserves are meant
to cover unexpected losses.
To undertake this study, we collected data on bond issues and issuers that did and did not
default, the ratings of those defaulting issues one-year prior to default, the price and coupon of
the bonds one year prior to default and the price of the bonds just after default. The price (and
coupon) one year prior to default (Pt-1 and Ct-1) and the price (and lost coupon) on default (Pt and
Ct) allowed us to calculate a loss rate for each bond default (i.e., [Pt – (Pt-1 + Ct-1/2)]/Pt-1. The
total number of defaulting bonds over the 18 year sample period, for which we had full price and
rating information, was 588. For an additional 104 bonds, we only had the rating and not the
price, one year prior to default. For these bonds, we assumed that their default experience
                                                
7 On December 31, 1989 the yield-spread between high yield corporate bonds and ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds was
7.24% and one year later it was 10.50% (Table 3). These were the highest levels for several decades and the
subsequent annual default rates (10.1% and 10.3%) were the highest default rates on high yield “junk” bonds ever
recorded. It should be noted that the highest dollar amount of defaults ($23.5 billion) in this market, perhaps in the
commercial loan market as well, occurred in the most recent year (1999), see Altman, et al (2000). Of course, the
size of these markets are much greater in 1999 than in the early 1990’s. Still recent default experience highlights the
cyclical nature of default rates and marks the end of the benign credit cycle of most of the 1990s.
9mirrored the distribution of losses of the bonds in each rating class for which we did have loss
data. Finally, there were over 100 bonds that were unrated and which we had no price data. We
placed them in the unrated category (see Table 1). Since we are only looking at the relative loss
experience for rated bonds, these unrated bonds played no further part in our study.
We then applied a number of models to calculate unexpected loss rates (or “economic”
capital requirements) for bonds of different ratings one-year prior to default,8 so as to calculate
loss rates at various confidence intervals. Three distribution models were used to initially
calculate loss rates; (i) a normal distribution (ii) the actual distribution and (iii) a Poisson
distribution (with a stable mean). The first two models are similar to those used in JP Morgan’s
CreditMetrics and the third is a simplified version of the model assumed in CSFP’s
CreditRisk+.  Tables 4-9 show the results for the full sample period for rating classes A through
CCC and below. Note that BIS bucket 2 is represented here by the ratings A, BBB, BB and B
and bucket 3 is represented by the CCC and lower category. Bucket 1 is not shown because of
non-existent defaults in the AAA to AA ratings range at one year prior to default.
In addition, we carried out a set of Monte-Carlo simulations.  Since most formal credit-
risk models -- such as CreditMetrics and CreditRisk+ contain certain parametric assumptions
(e.g., about correlations) embedded in their structures, these formal models’ results reflect, in
part, these untested assumptions.  Monte-Carlo simulations, by contrast, allow estimation of the
size of losses in the tail of loan loss distributions conditional only on assumptions made about the
composition of bank portfolios. In the simulations, we follow Carey (1998) and look at a number
of portfolios. The first reflects the allocation for US life insurance company privately placed
bonds. In this allocation, approximately 13% are below investment grade. The second reflects the
                                                
8 The one-year horizon is consistent with the horizon adopted by most internal credit risk models.
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suggested allocation by Carey for US banks commercial loan portfolios.  This reflects, on
average, a much lower credit quality than that adopted by life insurers, with some 50% being
below investment grade. In addition to these two portfolios, we look at loss distributions for
portfolios that contain respectively only AAA, AA and A bonds (portfolio 3), BBB bonds
(portfolio 4), BB bonds (portfolio 5), B bonds (portfolio 6) and CCC and lower (portfolio 7).
In conducting the Monte-Carlo simulation, a portfolio aggregate size is chosen (here ($1
billion) and assets are drawn at random subject to the composition of the portfolios conforming
to the representative portfolios discussed above (until the target aggregate portfolio size is
reached). The loss rate on the portfolio is then calculated. For each portfolio (1 to 7) the
simulation is repeated 50,000 times and the frequency distribution of losses forms an estimate of
the relevant loss distribution. From that loss distribution, loss rates at different quantiles can be
analyzed, and by implication the capital reserves needed to absorb the level of unexpected losses
are determined. Unexpected losses are the difference between the loss rate at a given quantile
and the mean, or expected, loss rate.
3.3 Empirical Results of Loss Distributions
Table 4 shows that, for A-rated bonds, 12,115 issuers did not default over this period,
while seven (7) A rated issuers defaulted within one year of being rated A. Of the seven, two
defaults had a loss rate in the 1% to 10% range, two had loss rates in the 11% to 20% range, two
had loss rates in the 21% to 30% range and one had a loss rate in the 51% to 60% range. The
mean loss rate (the expected loan loss reserve) for the entire A-rated sample was .012%. Recall,
we do not observe any one year losses for AAA or AA rated bonds; hence, no tables are
presented.
11
For capital or unexpected loss calculations, different quantiles were used to describe
extreme losses. The more conservative the banker or the regulator, the higher the quantile
chosen. For the normal distribution, we calculated the 95% (1.64485σ), 99% (2.32634σ) and
99.97 (3.431925σ) unexpected loss rates. As can be seen for single A bonds, these unexpected
loss rates were respectively 1.021%, 1.448% and 2.142%. These are well below the current 8%
capital requirement (actually quite close to the proposed guideline for AAA/AA credits).
However, as is well known, the loss distribution of loans is highly non-normal, so the second
calculation, also shown in Table 4, uses the actual distribution of bond losses. To calculate a
particular quantile’s loss rate involves counting backwards under the actual default distribution
and finding the loss rate coincident with the default that just matches the quantile. For example,
to find the unexpected loss rate consistent with the 99.97% quantile (i.e., where capital is
sufficiently large to meet all but 3 losses out of 10,0009), we calculate that .03% of 12,122 is 3.6
issuers. We then count backwards under the A-rated bond distribution and find that 3.6 defaults
are coincident with a loss range of 11% to 20%. In all cases, we take the mid-point of the loss
range (here 15%) to reflect the unexpected loss. To net out the loan loss reserve, we deduct from
15% the expected or mean loss rate (here .012%) to get an unexpected loss rate at the 99.97%
quantile of 14.988%. This is clearly much larger than the current 8% ratio of the BIS. Note,
however, at the less conservative quantiles of 99% and 95%, the unexpected loss rates (and
hence capital ratios) are actually zero.
                                                
9 Alternatively, where the bank will have sufficient capital to survive all but 3 years out of the next 10,000 years.
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Table 4 carries out a similar exercise to the one discussed above for BBB, BB, B and
CCC (and lower) bonds. In addition, a “total” column aggregates across all of the rating
classes.10
We can use these calculations to examine the degree of homogeneity (heterogeneity)
across the four rating grades A, BBB, BB and B entering into bucket 2. Using the 99th percentile,
or its equivalent, as a standard for comparison, we can see that, under the normal distribution
assumption, the capital requirements for the four ratings classes are respectively 1.448%,
2.323%, 7.102% and 17.030%. Even under the highly unrealistic assumption of normally
distributed loss rates, B rated bonds’ risk is more than 10 times that of A rated bonds.11  Looking
at the actual distribution of losses at the 99th percentile, a similar degree of heterogeneity
emerges. Specifically, the capital requirements are respectively 0%, 0%, 4.7% and 43.266%,
indicating a very clear distinction between unexpected loss rates of investment grade borrowers
(those rated A and BBB) and below investment grade borrowers (those rate BB and B). Thus,
Table 4 suggests that if we use external rating agency buckets, as the current proposal suggests,
for capital requirement risk-weights, the degree of granularity is far too coarse.
Finally, what can be said about the relative risk weightings of buckets 2 and 3. Under the
BIS proposal, bucket 2 has a 100% risk-weight while bucket 3 has a 150% risk weight –
implying that loans in bucket 3 are 1½ times “more default risky” than those in bucket 2. As can
be seen from Table 4, even where we use, for bucket 2, the lowest rating grade (B), and
unexpected loss rates are used to compare with bucket 3 loss rates, the normal distribution
                                                
10 Interestingly, the total mean or expected loss rate of 0.598% is quite close to the level of banks’ average loan loss reserve
holdings in recent years.
11 This compares to an expected loss rate ratio of about 100 times greater for B vs. A rated bonds (see the cumulative loss rates in
Altman, etal. (1999). For example, the five year cumulative loss rate for bonds rated A upon issuance is 0.12%, while the B rated
bonds’ loss rate is 13.9%. The fifth year’s marginal (one year) loss rate is 0.04% for A rated bonds compared to 3.36% for B
rated bonds.
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suggests a risk-weighting ratio of 3.2 times (i.e., 55.455% divided by 17.030%) at the 99% level.
The equivalent 99% relative risk-weighting was 1.64 times using the actual distribution. Of
course, these relative risk-weightings are far larger when either A, BBB, or BB are used to
compare to loss rates in bucket 3.  Overall, these results suggests that for the new BIS proposal,
the degree of a loan’s credit risk in bucket 3 may be relatively underpriced (under capitalized) to
the that of a loan in bucket 2.
3.4 Robustness Checks
We decided to carry out a number of additional robustness checks to examine how the
degree of heterogeneity in bucket 2 changes under “alternative” assumptions. In Table 5, we
recognize that Table 4’s findings are biased towards finding higher capital ratios and may be
confounding loan losses with bond losses (the latter is what we actually measure). Both biases
occur, in part, because for non-defaulters we have used the number of issuers (i.e., implicitly
assuming one bond per issuer), while the defaults reflect the number of defaulted issues (i.e., one
issuer may default on a number of bonds).12 This bias is corrected in Table 5 where we only
analyze the loss rate on the most senior bond or note of each defaulting issuer. As a result, the
total number of defaults falls from 692 to 334.13 This has the additional advantage of making
bonds look more like loans, since most bank loans have covenants and/or collateral backing that
make them highly senior in the debt repayment structure—especially on default.
Again we find a considerable degree of heterogeneity persisting. For example, at the 99%
quantile (2.3264σ), and assuming the normal distribution, the unexpected loss rates vary widely:
i.e., 0.446% (A), 5.619% (BBB), 8.306% (BB), 24.694% (B). At the same 99% percent quantile,
                                                
12 The rating agencies only report the number of issuers for each grade rating category in each of the years in our
sample period. See, for example, Table 16 in S&P (1999).
13 The most senior bond is defined as the one with the highest price one-year prior to default.
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under the actual distribution, the unexpected loss rates are respectively 0%, 0%, 0%, and
72.874%.
Table 6 repeats a similar exercise as Table 5 but assumes defaults follow a Poisson
distribution with a stable mean.14 For bucket 2, the simple Poisson model produces similar
results as those in Tables 4 and 5. In particular, the unexpected loss rates at the 99% quantile are
respectively: 0% (A), 0%(BBB), 0.205% (BB) and 17.011%(B).
Finally, Table 7 repeats a similar exercise to those above except that it replaces the
number of issuers in the no default category with an estimate of the number of issues.15  This
considerably increases the number of non-defaults and reduces the mean or expected loss rate.
The unexpected loss rates are also affected because of the larger total sample size. As can be
seen from Table 7, however, using estimated issues instead of issuers for the non-defaulting class
leaves the basic conclusions unchanged. Specifically, again using the 99th percent quantile, the
unexpected loss rate under the normal distribution is 0.604% for A rated borrowers versus
9.550% for B rated borrowers, while using the actual distribution the relative unexpected loss
rates for A versus B are respectively 0% versus 33.912%. Table 8 shows a similar “lack of
granularity” using the Poisson distribution. In this case 0% versus 8.704%.16
                                                
14 The CreditRisk+® model assumes defaults follow a Poisson distribution around a shifting mean. Specifically, the mean default
rate is assumed to follow a gamma distribution. The Poisson distribution is a simple distribution in that its mean equals its
variance.  Assuming a stable mean will tend to underestimate the “fat-tailedness” of the distribution and thus unexpected loss
rates will be understated.
15 This was done by taking three monthly samples (for December 1987, December 1992 and February 1999) on the number of
issues per issuer from S and P bond guides, calculating an average number of issues per defaulting issuer in each rating category
and multiplying the number of issuers row in Table 1 by the resulting average number of issues per issuer.
16 Similar conclusions, regarding the relative risk weights of buckets 2 and 3, to those discussed earlier are also reached by
analyzing Tables 5 through 8. The large risk weighting differences between rating classes (and lower) are particularly evident.
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3.5. Simulation Results
Table 9 looks at the loss rates generated from Monte-Carlo simulations of the seven
different portfolios discussed earlier (US life insurer-type portfolio, US bank-type portfolio, and
different agency ratings). Each loss distribution is based on 50,000 simulations and an aggregate
portfolio size of $1 billion. In recent years, $1 billion in asset size has been viewed as
representative of medium-sized US banks.17
From Table 9, it can be seen that at the 99% quantile, the unexpected loss rates suggest
capital requirements much lower than 8% in all cases, even the most risky rating class. For the
insurance company portfolio (portfolio 1), the unexpected loss rate (99% loss rate minus the
mean loss rate) suggests a capital ratio of 0.673% - 0.109% = 0.564%. For the riskier bank loan
portfolio (portfolio 2), the implied capital ratio is 1.077%. Looking at the question of bucket
homogeneity, which is the key focus of this paper, it can be seen that unexpected loss rates for
BBB vs. BB vs. B differ significantly, i.e., specifically, 0.235% vs. 0.769% vs. 1.765%.18  The
simulation results clearly show that the unexpected loss rate of the investment grade components
(A and BBB) of bucket 2 is much lower than the below investment grade components of bucket
2 (BB and B). Even for the CCC and lower portfolio (bucket 3) the unexpected loss rate is 15.2%
- 10.119% = 5.08%. This may imply that the suggested BIS capital ratio for bucket 3 (12%) is
                                                
17 Interestingly, the results of our simulations were quite insensitive to asset portfolio size assumptions beyond the $1 billion size
range.
18 In this test, A was combined with AA and AAA to be comparable with the Carey (1998) paper.
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perhaps too high.19  Overall, the Monte-Carlo simulations confirm the results of the parametric
approaches discussed in Tables 4-8 -- especially the heterogeneity of bucket 2.
4.0 Summary and Proposal
This paper has examined two specific aspects of stage 1 of the BIS’s proposed reforms to
the risk-based capital ratio. It has been argued that relying on “traditional” agency ratings could
produce cyclically lagging rather leading capital requirements, resulting in an enhanced rather
than reduced degree of instability in the banking and financial system. In addition, even if risk-
weights were to be tied to traditional agency ratings, the current bucketing proposal lacks a
sufficient degree of granularity. In particular, lumping A and BBB (investment grade borrowers)
together with BB and B (below investment grade borrowers) severely misprices risk within that
bucket and calls, at a minimum, for that bucket to be split into two.
Table 10 repeats the calculations of Table 5, but groups together A and BBB for
comparison with BB and B. If we take the most conservative regulatory view and require capital
to be sufficient to meet the 99.97% quantile test, then we can calculate some relative risk-
weightings as examples for a split bucket 2.  Specifically, in Table 10, which is based on senior
bond defaults, (the bond default data that most closely resembles loans), we observe 14 defaults
out of 19,658 observations in the A/BBB investment grade bucket and 227 out of 10,535 in the
non-investment grade BB/B bucket within the one-year time horizon. At the 99.97% level, for
the actual distribution results, the ratio of unexpected losses between the two buckets is 1.65
(90.846/54.96). Under the normal distribution assumption for all levels of confidence (95% to
                                                
19 This assumes that appropriate reserves for the high expected losses (e.g., over 10%) are deducted from the profit and loss
accounts.
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99.97%), the ratio is about 5.4 (e.g., 28.240/5.208 for 3.43σ or the 99.97% quantile).20  Hence,
we find a considerable difference in risk between these buckets, as expected. The CCC and lower
bucket is considerably more risky under the normal distribution assumption – about 2.5 times the
BB/B bucket.21 Since the CCC and lower category has so few observations (387), we cannot be
as confident as we would like to be about its exact risk compared to other buckets.
4.1 A Revised Bucket Proposal
A bucket system with four categories, and with a weighting system something like that
shown in Table 11, would accomplish much of what the BIS proposal is attempting to do, and
also comes closer to capturing the reality of actual relative default losses by ratings.
We constructed this Table based on the following logic. We felt constrained to choose a
non-zero weighting for the first bucket (AAA/AA), although our results (over the last 19 years)
clearly show that no defaults have actually taken place within one year for bonds in these two
highest ratings. The choice of 10% for bucket 1 is therefore arbitrary but still less than the BIS
proposal’s 20%. A second consideration was that we felt it appropriate to give the new BB/B
non-investment grade bucket a full 100% weighting.22   This left us with a decision as to the
appropriate A/BBB classification. We decided to use a ratio of about 3.33 to 1 when comparing
the BB/B bucket with this A/BBB bucket. This is about the midpoint between the normal
distribution and actual distribution’s results at the 99.97% quantile (1.65 and 5.40), Hence, the
designation of 30% for our bucket 2. Note that this 30% weighting is considerably lower than the
                                                
20 The 99.97% level is actually not shown but is essentially identical to the 99.9% level.
21 The results for the CCC and lower bucket was about the same as the BB/B for the actual distribution, since both were near the
maximum loss possible at the 99.97% level.
22 One could actually argue for a higher weighting in this bucket but this would almost surely cutoff most lending to firms in this
bucket --- a bucket which we believe now represents a very high proportion of current loans outstanding.
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BIS proposal and the 100% weighting for bucket 3 is the same as their earlier proposal. Finally,
we adopt the same 150% weighting for below B- credits (bucket 4).
4.2 The Unrated Class
Note that we do not propose any specific weighting for the category “unrated.” We feel
that the appropriate weighting system that bank regulators sanction will be based on a
combination of external and internal ratings. Using internal ratings obviates the need for an
“unrated” class since banks should be rating all customers. Also, the currently proposed BIS
unrated class is essentially a classification that assumes no clear risk analysis. That is not very
helpful in a world where most assets are unrated by external rating agencies; hence, the
inevitable sanctioning of internal systems.
4.3 Final Comment
We are aware that our proposals are not prefect, but they appear to resemble more closely
the existing data on unexpected losses. Although we do not expect regulatory capital arbitrage to
cease completely, we are convinced that it will be reduced with our modifications and will bring
regulatory capital closer to economic capital estimates.
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TABLE 1
Proposal BIS Risk Weighting System for Bank Loan Credits
Claim Assessment
AAA to
AA-
A+ to A- BBB+ to
BBB-
BB+ to B- Below B- Unrated
Sovereigns     0%      20%      50%    100%     150%   100%
Option 11     20%      50%    100%    100%     150%   100%
Banks
Option 22     20%      50%      50%3    100%3     150%     50%3
Corporates     20%    100%    100%    100%     150%   100%
1Risk weighting based on risk weighting of sovereign in which the bank is incorporated.
2Risk weighting based on the assessment of the individual bank.
3Claims on banks of a short original maturity, for example less than six months, would receive a
weighting that is one category more favorable than the usual risk weight on the
                                                                              TABLE 2
Rating Agencies Extreme Credit Quality Categories
Credit Assessment Institution Very  High Quality Assessment Very Low Quality Assessment
Fitch IBCA AA- and above Bellow B-
Moody’s Aa3 and above Below B3
Standard & Poor’s AA- and above Below B-
Export insurance agencies 1 7
Source: Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (June 1999).
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TABLE 3
ANNUAL RETURNS, YIELDS AND SPREADS
ON TEN-YEAR TREASURY (TREAS)
AND HIGH YIELD (HY) BONDS*
(1978-1999)
RETURN(%) PROMISED YIELD(%)
YEAR HY TREAS SPREAD HY TREAS SPREAD
1999
1998
1.73
4.04
(8.41)
12.77
10.14
(8.73)
11.41
10.04
6.44
4.65
4.97
5.39
1997 14.27 11.16 3.11 9.20 5.75 3.45
1996 11.24 0.04 11.20 9.58 6.42 3.16
1995 22.40 23.58 (1.18) 9.76 5.58 4.18
1994 (2.55) (8.29) 5.74 11.50 7.83 3.67
1993 18.33 12.08 6.25 9.08 5.80 3.28
1992 18.29 6.50 11.79 10.44 6.69 3.75
1991 43.23 17.18 26.05 12.56 6.70 5.86
1990 (8.46) 6.88 (15.34) 18.57 8.07 10.50
1989 1.98 16.72 (14.74) 15.17 7.93 7.24
1988 15.25 6.34 8.91 13.70 9.15 4.55
1987 4.57 (2.67) 7.24 13.89 8.83 5.06
1986 16.50 24.08 (7.58) 12.67 7.21 5.46
1985 26.08 31.54 (5.46) 13.50 8.99 4.51
1984 8.50 14.82 (6.32) 14.97 11.87 3.10
1983 21.80 2.23 19.57 15.74 10.70 5.04
1982 32.45 42.08 (9.63) 17.84 13.86 3.98
1981 7.56 0.48 7.08 15.97 12.08 3.89
1980 (1.00) (2.96) 1.96 13.46 10.23 3.23
1979 3.69 (0.86) 4.55 12.07 9.13 2.94
1978 7.57 (1.11) 8.68 10.92 8.11 2.81
ARITHMETIC ANNUAL AVERAGE:
1978-1999 12.16 9.28 2.88 12.82 8.27 4.35
COMPOUND ANNUAL AVERAGE:
1978-1999 11.54 8.58 2.96
*End of year yields.
Source: Salomon Smith Barney Inc.'s High Yield Composite Index; Altman et al (2000).
Table 4
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF LOSSES
(PRINCIPAL AND COUPON), (1981 – 9/1999)
BY RATING ONE YEAR BEFORE DEFAULT
(NORMAL AND ACTUAL LOSS DISTRIBUTIONS)
Range  of
Default Losses
Midpoint A BBB BB B CCC & Lower Total
0 0 12115 7529 5311 4997 294 30246
0.01 – 0.10 0.05 2 26 11 81 43 163
0.11 – 0.20 0.15 2 16 15 89 18 140
0.21 – 0.30 0.25 2 4 18 81 36 141
0.31 – 0.40 0.35 0 1 8 62 24 95
0.41 – 0.50 0.45 0 0 8 29 24 61
0.51 - .060 0.55 1 0 3 17 18 39
0.61 – 0.70 0.65 0 0 1 10 21 32
0.71 – 0.80 0.75 0 0 0 2 5 7
0.81 – 0.90 0.85 0 0 0 4 6 10
0.91 – 0.94 0.92 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.95 – 0.98 0.96 0 0 0 0 1 1
0.99 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 3 3
Total 12122 7576 5375 5372 493 30938
Mean 0.012% 0.067% 0.298% 1.734% 14.079% 0.598%
Median 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
St.Dev 0.628% 1.027% 3.181% 8.066% 29.890% 5.001%
3.43192sigma-E(L) 2.142% 3.458% 10.619% 25.947% 88.501% 16.566%
2.32634sigma-E(L) 1.448% 2.323% 7.102% 17.030% 55.455% 11.037%
1.64485sigma-E(L) 1.021% 1.623% 2.051% 11.533% 35.085% 7.628%
99.97% 14.988% 3.6 24.933% 2.3 54.702% 1.6 83.266% 1.6 85.921% 0.1 84.402% 9.3
99.00% 0.000% 121.2 0.000% 75.8 4.702% 53.8 43.266% 53.7 70.921% 4.9 24.402% 309.4
95.00% 0.000% 606.1 0.000% 378.8 0.000% 268.8 13.266% 268.6 50.921% 24.7 0.000% 1546.9
Source: Standard & Poor’s NYU Salomon Center Default Data Base
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Table 5
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF LOSSES
(PRINCIPLE AND COUPON), (1981 – 9/1999)
BY RATING ONE YEAR BEFORE DEFAULT
(NORMAL AND ACTUAL LOSS DISTRIBUTIONS)
(Based on Number of Issuers)
Range of Midpoint A BBB BB B CCC & Lower Total
Default Losses
0 0 12115 7529 5311 4997 294 30246
0.01 - 0.10 0.05 0 0 0 14 4 18
0.11 - 0.20 0.15 2 1 0 11 8 22
0.21 - 0.30 0.25 0 1 1 18 11 31
0.31 - 0.40 0.35 0 1 5 19 11 36
0.41 - 0.50 0.45 0 1 2 22 11 36
0.51 - 0.60 0.55 0 3 3 32 9 47
0.61 - 0.70 0.65 0 0 3 33 17 53
0.71 - 0.80 0.75 0 4 1 28 12 45
0.81 - 0.90 0.85 0 0 1 19 7 27
0.91 - 0.94 0.92 0 0 2 11 1 14
0.95 - 0.98 0.96 0 0 1 1 2 4
0.99 0.99 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Default 2 12 19 208 93 334
Total Non-Default 12115 7529 5311 4997 294 30246
Total 12117 7541 5330 5205 387 30580
Mean 0.002% 0.091% 0.205% 2.126% 12.078% 0.574%
Median 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
St.Dev 0.193% 2.454% 3.658% 11.529% 24.521% 6.028%
3.43192sigma-E(L) 0.659% 8.332% 12.351% 37.440% 72.077% 20.114%
2.32634sigma-E(L) 0.446% 5.619% 8.306% 24.694% 44.967% 13.450%
1.64485sigma-E(L) 0.314% 3.946% 5.813% 16.837% 28.256% 9.342%
99.97% 0.000% 3.6 74.909% 2.3 91.795% 1.6 89.874% 1.6 83.922% 0.1 91.426% 9.2
99.00% 0.000% 121.2 0.000% 75.4 0.000% 53.3 72.874% 52.1 72.922% 3.9 14.426% 305.8
95.00% 0.000% 605.9 0.000% 377.1 0.000% 266.5 0.000% 260.3 62.922% 19.4 0.000% 1529.0
Sourcs: Standard & Poor's, NYU Salomon Center Default Data Base.
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Table 6
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF LOSSES
(PRINCIPLE AND COUPON), (1981 – 9/1999)
BY RATING ONE YEAR BEFORE DEFAULT
(NORMAL AND ACTUAL LOSS DISTRIBUTIONS)
(Based on Number of Issuers) – Poisson Process for Defaults
Range of Midpoint A BBB BB B CCC & Lower Total
Default Losses
0 0 12115 7529 5311 4997 294 30246
0.01 - 0.10 0.05 0 0 0 14 4 18
0.11 - 0.20 0.15 2 1 0 11 8 22
0.21 - 0.30 0.25 0 1 1 18 11 31
0.31 - 0.40 0.35 0 1 5 19 11 36
0.41 - 0.50 0.45 0 1 2 22 11 36
0.51 - 0.60 0.55 0 3 3 32 9 47
0.61 - 0.70 0.65 0 0 3 33 17 53
0.71 - 0.80 0.75 0 4 1 28 12 45
0.81 - 0.90 0.85 0 0 1 19 7 27
0.91 - 0.94 0.92 0 0 2 11 1 14
0.95 - 0.98 0.96 0 0 1 1 2 4
0.99 0.99 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Default 2 12 19 208 93 334
Total Non-Default 12115 7529 5311 4997 294 30246
Total 12117 7541 5330 5205 387 30580
Mean 0.002% 0.091% 0.205% 2.126% 12.078% 0.574%
Median 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
St.Dev 0.193% 2.454% 3.658% 11.529% 24.521% 6.028%
99.97% 0.000% 1 0.091% 2 0.409% 3 23.391% 12 495.178% 42 2.869% 6
99.00% 0.000% 0 0.000% 1 0.205% 2 17.011% 9 410.636% 35 1.721% 4
95.00% 0.000% 0 0.000% 1 0.000% 1 12.759% 7 374.403% 32 1.148% 3
default rate m per 100 0.017 0.159 0.356 3.996 24.031 1.092
loans in the portfolio
99.997% 99.965% 99.949% 99.976% 99.979% 99.979%
99.178% 99.194% 99.421% 99.671% 99.182% 99.001%
99.178% 99.194% 94.972% 96.975% 96.454% 94.921%
Sources: Standard & Poor's NYU Salomon Center Default Data Base.
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Table 7
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF LOSSES
(PRINCIPLE AND COUPON), (1981 – 9/1999) 1 YEAR BEFORE DEFAULT
BY RATING ONE YEAR BEFORE DEFAULT
(NORMAL AND ACTUAL LOSS DISTRIBUTIONS)
(Based on Number of issues)
Range of Mid point A BBB BB B CCC & Lower Total
Default of Losses
0 0 67507 34525 12137 8187 487 122843
0.01 - 0.10 0.05 2 26 11 81 43 163
0.11 - 0.20 0.15 2 16 15 89 18 140
0.21 - 0.30 0.25 2 4 18 81 36 141
0.31 - 0.40 0.35 0 1 8 62 24 95
0.41 - 0.50 0.45 0 0 8 29 24 61
0.51 - 0.60 0.55 1 0 3 17 18 39
0.61 - 0.70 0.65 0 0 1 10 21 32
0.71 - 0.80 0.75 0 0 0 2 5 7
0.81 - 0.90 0.85 0 0 0 4 6 10
0.91 - 0.94 0.92 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.95 - 0.98 0.96 0 0 0 0 1 1
0.99 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 3 3
Total Default 7 47 64 375 199 692
Total Non-Default 67507 34525 12137 8187 487 122843
Total 67514 34572 12201 8562 686 123535
Mean 0.002% 0.015% 0.131% 1.088% 10.118% 0.150%
Median 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
St.Dev 0.261% 0.286% 1.421% 4.573% 20.549% 2.488%
3.43192sigma-E(L) 0.892% 0.967% 4.747% 14.605% 60.406% 8.390%
2.32634sigma-E(L) 0.604% 0.651% 3.176% 9.550% 37.687% 5.639%
1.64485sigma-E(L) 0.427% 0.456% 2.207% 6.434% 23.683% 3.943%
99.97% 0.000% 20.3 14.985% 10.4 54.869% 3.7 83.912% 2.6 89.882% 0.2 64.850% 37.1
99.00% 0.000% 675.1 0.000% 345.7 0.000% 122.0 33.912% 85.6 74.882% 6.9 0.000% 1235.4
95.00% 0.000% 3375.7 0.000% 1728.6 0.000% 610.1 0.000% 428.1 54.882% 34.3 0.000% 6176.8
Sources: Standard & Poor's, NYU Salomon Center Default Data Base
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Table 8
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF LOSSES
(PRINCIPAL AND COUPON), (1981 – 9/1999)
BY RATING ONE YEAR BEFORE DEFAULT
(NORMAL AND ACTUAL LOSS DISTRIBUTIONS)
(Based on Number of issues) – Poisson Process for Default
Range of Midpoint A BBB BB B CCC & Total
Default Losses
0 0 67507 34525 12137 8187 487 122843
0.01 - 0.10 0.05 2 26 11 81 43 163
0.11 - 0.20 0.15 2 16 15 89 18 140
0.21 - 0.30 0.25 2 4 18 81 36 141
0.31 - 0.40 0.35 0 1 8 62 24 95
0.41 - 0.50 0.45 0 0 8 29 24 61
0.51 - 0.60 0.55 1 0 3 17 18 39
0.61 - 0.70 0.65 0 0 1 10 21 32
0.71 - 0.80 0.75 0 0 0 2 5 7
0.81 - 0.90 0.85 0 0 0 4 6 10
0.91 - 0.94 0.92 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.95 - 0.98 0.96 0 0 0 0 1 1
0.99 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 3 3
Total 7 47 64 375 199 692
Total Non-Default 67507 34525 12137 8187 487 122843
Total 67514 34572 12201 8562 686 123535
Mean 0.002% 0.015% 0.131% 1.088% 10.118% 0.150%
Median 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
St.Dev 0.261% 0.286% 1.421% 4.573% 20.549% 2.488%
3.43192sigma-E(L) 0.892% 0.967% 4.747% 14.605% 60.406% 8.390%
2.32634sigma-E(L) 0.604% 0.651% 3.176% 9.550% 37.687% 5.639%
1.64485sigma-E(L) 0.427% 0.456% 2.207% 6.434% 23.683% 3.943%
99.97% 0.000% 1 0.015% 2 0.393% 4 13.055% 13 485.668% 49 0.449% 4
99.00% 0.000% 0 0.000% 1 0.262% 3 8.704% 9 414.841% 42 0.300% 3
95.00% 0.000% 0 0.000% 0 0.131% 2 7.616% 8 374.369% 38 0.150% 2
default rate m per 100
loans in the portfolio 0.010 0.136 0.525 4.380 29.009 0.560
99.996% 99.971% 99.979% 99.967% 99.979% 99.987%
99.115% 99.288% 99.792% 99.629% 99.037% 99.862%
99.115% 88.303% 98.368% 97.098% 94.853% 98.790%
Sources: Standard & Poor's, NYU Salomon Center Default Data Base
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Table 9
MONTE-CARLO SIMULATION OF LOSS RATES USING DATA 1981 – 6/1999
Simulated loss rates (%)
Confidence Level
Portfolio Portfolio size ($b)       mean 95% 97.5% 99% 99.5% 99.9% 99.95%
1. 13% < BBB (P.P.) 1.00 0.109 0.468 0.55 0.673 0.767 1.007 1.112
2. 50% < BBB (Loans) 1.00 0.409 1.106 1.28 1.486 1.657 2 2.18
3. AAA, AA, A 1.00 0.003 0 0 0.05 0.25 0.55 0.55
4. BBB 1.00 0.015 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.3 0.4 0.4
5. BB 1.00 0.131 0.55 0.7 0.9 1 1.25 1.35
6. B 1.00 1.085 2.2 2.5 2.85 3.05 3.6 3.8
7. CCC & lower 1.00 10.119 13.6 14.35 15.2 15.95 17.1 17.56
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Table 10
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF LOSSES
(PRINCIPAL AND COUPON), (1981 – 9/1999)
BY RATING ONE YEAR BEFORE DEFAULT
(NORMAL AND ACTUAL LOSS DISTRIBUTIONS
(Based on Number of Issuers)
Range of Midpoint A&BBB BB&B CCC& Lower Total
Default Losses
0 0 19644 10308 294 30246
0.01 - 0.10 0.05 0 14 4 18
0.11 - 0.20 0.15 3 11 8 22
0.21 - 0.30 0.25 1 19 11 31
0.31 - 0.40 0.35 1 24 11 36
0.41 - 0.50 0.45 1 24 11 36
0.51 - 0.60 0.55 3 35 9 47
0.61 - 0.70 0.65 0 36 17 53
0.71 - 0.80 0.75 4 29 12 45
0.81 - 0.90 0.85 0 20 7 27
0.91 - 0.94 0.92 0 13 1 14
0.95 - 0.98 0.96 0 2 2 4
0.99 0.99 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0
Total Default 14 227 93 334
Total Non-Default 19644 10308 294 30246
Total 19658 10535 387 30580
Mean 0.036% 1.154% 12.078% 0.574%
Median 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
St.Dev 1.528% 8.565% 24.521% 6.028%
3.43192sigma-E(L) 5.208% 28.240% 72.077% 20.114%
2.32634sigma-E(L) 3.519% 18.771% 44.967% 13.450%
1.64485sigma-E(L) 2.477% 12.934% 28.256% 9.342%
99.97% 54.964% 5.9 90.846% 3.2 83.922% 0.1 91.426% 9.2
99.00% 0.000% 196.6 53.846% 105.4 72.922% 3.9 14.426% 305.8
95.00% 0.000% 982.9 0.000% 526.8 62.922% 19.4 0.000% 1529.0
Sources: Standard & Poor's, NYU Salomon Center Default Data Base
TABLE 11
An Alternative Risk Weighting Proposal for Bank Corporate Loans
     AAA  to AA- A+ to BBB- BB+ to B- Below
Corporates 10% 30% 100% 150%
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FIGURE 1
Proportion of Bonds in Different BIS Proposed Buckets
(1989-1998)
                Source: Moody’s Investor Services, New York
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FIGURE 2
Proportion of Bonds in Different BIS Proposed Buckets
(1989-1998)
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Sourc e : Standard & Poor 's , New  Y ork
